Disclaimer: I should point out that one of the reasons why I poke fun at the Bourgeoisie is because I think it’s a really bad thing to have rigid social hierarchies. With that said, this blog post contains “colorful language”.
It’s been a month since I’ve arrived back from my short-lived, all-purposed trip to New York City to attend a private equity get-together that was hosted at the Yale Club. Looking back in retrospect, I wasted my money. The individuals, who disguised themselves as “investors” (yawn), were that [investors], but they were something else as well. They were actors. Their “interest” (yawn) in the concept of PIR played a supportive role worthy of an Oscar® nomination too. See, when you, as a [Black] entrepreneur, find yourself in a setting surrounded by people who look as if they’re afflicted with the weakened bone density of resolute polio survivors, you’ll begin questioning your own motives, and likely, the motives of those with the all-deceitful smile.
Communication is the medium of all revelations. Whenever communication, between one or more parties, begins to lessen, that is the motive compelled by deceit–and those who mobilize deceit as a corrigible means. Have people ever pondered that the reason why these investors have such an advantage is because of the social networks they utilize by which they share information? So, how does one reduce such an advantage when they’re kept “outside of the circle“?
Answer: You have to broadcast that information more widely to reduce the “information advantage” that these investors possess.
There’s a reason why that Silicon Valley-residing tub-o-lard Ron Conway despises entrepreneurs that send him a non-disclosure agreement, saying that by doing so it implies that the entrepreneur doesn’t trust the investor. Of course I don’t. You think just because I was invited to attend the private equity forum at the Yale Club that I’ll just blindly waltz in there and automatically invest my trust in people whom I’m meeting and greeting with for the first time–ever? These “investors” (yawn) don’t know who I am nor did I ever once feel at ease with any of them. The name of the game, from their perspective, is make me [the entrepreneur] feel as comfortable as possible. Psychologically, this throws you off your game. With that said, you are practically guaranteed, some time down the line (such as now), to have some sort of personal crisis while you’re hanging onto the other end of the line–and by “the other end of the line”, I’m referring back to the medium of communication.
In other words, the phone.
One of the investors in attendance at the private equity forum was Mr. Tony Dimun, chairman of Nascent Enterprises, LLC., based in Short Hills, New Jersey. Standing next to him, during one of the breakout sessions (a twenty-minute interim between presentations by those entrepreneurs dumb enough to fork over $19,000 (or more) just to stand before everyone and “beg” for 5+ minutes) was Mr. Michael Segal, president of Halcyon Cabot Partners, Ltd. Understand the advantage of having strong data (e.g., personal experience) in your favor. Mr. Segal openly expressed that he suffers an allergic reaction to his skin resulting from the frames of his eyewear, supposedly from “non-titanium” material. That’s a body chemistry-issue; an issue addressed by PIR. At that point, Mr. Dimun states to me, (premise of strong data) that he knows (actual strong data) a particular manufacturer of wearable devices that he believes would be interested [in PIR Wear™]. Understand what just happened here: Mr. Dimun’s statement was intended as data to support my personal experience there at the Yale Club, but it’s weak data–and weak data can be challenged.
So, how was Mr. Dimun’s weak data challenged?
Answer: It was challenged from the initial premise of his statement about some “manufacturer of wearable devices“. This is the face of the weak data.
What reinforced the weak data was the fact that just eight days after first introducing myself to Mr. Dimun at the Yale Club, this mawfucka states that he has contacted this supposed “manufacturer of wearable devices” and that this supposed “manufacturer of wearable devices” has expressed an interest in what Hexagon Lavish® is doing. If you’ll notice, the initial premise of the weak data (what Mr. Dimun initially stated about this supposed “manufacturer of wearable devices” is the same as the conclusion, or what was stated eight days later–over the phone). Yeah, that’s right, over the phone–see, now it’s all falling back on revelations–communication. This is just one way that these punk mawfuckas “play chess”; Mr. Dimun had already relayed [shared] information (about PIR Wear™) to this supposed “manufacturer of wearable devices“; and, to add salt to the wound, has refused to maintain the stability of the medium of communication. If–and only if–Mr. Dimun’s weak data position indicated that this supposed “manufacturer of wearable devices” was interested with the intention of shoving a term sheet in my face accompanied with a check that had a lot of zeroes, my position would be of that of the weak data variety. It would have given Mr. Dimun the advantage of leaving my argument as an artifact of the weird kind–because his strong data would’ve been able to contradict my subjective impressions of the environment in which we met [the Grand Ballroom of the Yale Club]–and my experiences (strong data) there. He would even be able to throw in that I just hung around people who were prone to lying.
So, what about people who manipulate data to fit their perceptions?
Answer: That’s the problem with weak data.
One thing that a social scientist would have done in a scenario akin to what I experienced at the Yale Club is add lots of variables to strengthen the data so that it’s difficult to make the data fit another person’s perception. Another thing that you have to keep in mind is experiences do, indeed, have an affect on my perception of the data, especially when your perception is based on weak data. Unfortunately, most of the investors cling to perception, and there is a strong bias and even contempt for entrepreneurs who do not fit their perception [of what an entrepreneur should be or who should be an entrepreneur]. This is a power move since it would render even the most basic techniques for acquiring the strong data completely useless.
Apply the principles of the strong data/weak data argument to a current issue of today…let’s say, “diversity” (yawn). The variables that comprise the weak data argument for “diversity” [in
“Silly Ass Valley” Silicon Valley] are the following:
“We are looking for underrepresented minorities…” (paraphrased)
“[Black] entrepreneurs only make up for blah blah blah percent…” (paraphrased)
Most of the fallacies that you read of in some of the recent articles concerning the issue of “diversity” out in
“Silly Ass Valley” Silicon Valley are small samples (in reference to the “statistical data” and/or percentages), straw man arguments, lying and misrepresentation. All of the aforementioned fallacies can fall under the weak data argument, as they render any defense against a strong data argument/position useless. The weak data argument/position can always be seen as coming from “someone looking in from the outside“, i.e., someone who’s not Black speaking on what they’ve observed about Blacks. The strong data argument/position, exemplified, would be someone who is Black speaking on what they have observed [observable effects] and what is the nature of the effects on them [because they’re Black] and what events have transpired because of those effects. An example would be a recent article that I read in which 500 Startups founder, and encephalograph extraordinaire, Dave McClure, made an “insensitive” joke about the population of Blacks in the Bay Area. He took the weak data position of showing his ass to an audience that outwardly expressed how bothersome it is that an issue such as “diversity” in “ Silly Ass Valley” Silicon Valley was actually rearing its ugly head–in 2015.
How would Mr. McClure feel if I were to make an “insensitive” joke about how he looks like the grandson of a Holocaust survivor who more than likely got deliberately knocked unconscious at Auschwitz as Nazi-trash watched in awe?
Answer: He’d probably cry harder than a rape victim.
On a personal note, I, for one, do not have a problem with “diversity” nor do I encounter any hindrance towards forming a diverse talent pool for Hexagon Lavish®. You see, it’s the mission behind Hexagon Lavish® that draws the right people to HL®. I don’t have to sit in front of a brainwashed-by-TechCrunch audience and campaign for “diversity”. HL® speaks for itself. I don’t have to slouch in a chair and trade “insensitive” inside jokes about other Black people with some bitch who more than likely bathes herself in Kikkoman’s. But, let me not waste too much of my time talking down one some bitch-ass; let me get back on track.
For those of you curious as to how I go about making my decision as to whom I hire, here’s the game: I only spend about 5% of my time ensuring that necessary conditions are met, e.g., I make sure that the applicant isn’t looking for some internship. For other conditions, I do not have specifics in mind. Whether an applicant codes in a certain language is not as important as the level of work that the candidate has previously produced in said certain language. Does said applicant have any experience in project involvement? If so, that is considerably impressive. All of this occurs before the “probationary period” commences.
The remaining 95% is spent considering the candidate’s fit with the culture of HL®. These qualities do not show up on someone’s rèsumé and/or curriculum vitae. If these qualities do not surface, during the “probationary period”, they’ll get the exit. If a person’s purely motivated for pecuniary reasons, they’ll get eliminated. HL® is designed to favor the candidate who exhibits intellectual curiosity and a willingness to learn. My firm is in its embryonic phase, however, this [hiring] process is more of an art than a science. It’s a gut feeling.
Now, let me ask the audience out there: In any form or fashion, did the issue of “diversity” (yawn), at all, surface in my description of the [concurrent] hiring process at HL®?
Answer: No. Nope. No, not at all. No bitch, I see nothin’.
I have a brilliant team–and it’s growing. A menagerie of human experience relative to science, mathematics, engineering and programming abilities. HL® is tremendous in ethnicities. That brings me to my next question.
If a small, known-to-only-a-few startup can attract talent coming from a miscellany of racial and ethnic backgrounds, accompanied with more top-tier degrees than you can shake a stick at, not have to deal with an issue regarding “diversity” (yawn), and yet, can’t get a lick of an investment, however, startups who are dealing with the issue of “diversity” (yawn) can get several licks of capital (cash, credit, etc.) from investors, how is it that people can’t see the problem with that predicament?
Unanswered inquiries, such as the aforementioned, is a qualifier of the value of being impatient. A lot of mawfuckas have the game twisted, thinking that by being patient (moreover, obedient) it’ll prove to potential parties (i.e., investors) how much you want to work with them. Realistically speaking, it shows how much of a bitch you are–to them; in your mind, you just don’t want to lose their “interest” (snicker) in what it is that you’re trying to do. Scratch that. Be impatient, but understand that it’s your experience (strong data) that defines the degrees of impatience by which you operate. By “impatient“, I don’t mean nag someone over the phone; I’m not implying sending e-mail after e-mail after e-mail; however, you need to apply more pressure as time builds over. You, yourself, are that pressure–and you have to embody this. You have to be the personification of that pressure.
As an example, I get angry easily but I don’t wear my anger on my face [I can’t].
To give you all a more in-depth explanation, back at the Yale Club in New York, after all of the attendees had gone through the mere tolerable gamut of watching people do their presentations, shook hands and exchanged business cards with one another and whatnot, we all made our way down from the Grand Ballroom on the 20th floor down to the library on the 4th floor for the two-hour evening reception where prior conversations initiated in the Grand Ballroom resumed without supposed interruption. There, I stood out–as the oddball in the room–which angered me but rather than stand there and stew in rancor, I made the move and initiated various conversations with a number of investors while they gulped down spirits and chowed on chicken-on-a-stick and a variety of hors d’oeuvres. Referring back to the being seen as the oddball, there were a few instances in which I wanted to head straight out of the club. One instance, was when I had initiated a conversation between myself and a [potential] investor; this woman, in the middle of my elevator pitch, stated that I had caught her at a bad time and that she had to go use the woman’s room. Okay, but this part-time investor/street walker, with her artificially over-tanned face and drawn-on eyebrows, just walked over to the other side of the room. Thoughts of punching that breadstick-eater ran through my mind within two seconds. If I were to cross paths with her today, she’d be found in someone’s trunk. That 4’10”, corn-toothed bitch; ol’ Chandra Levy-looking ass whore.
Conclusively, the value of being impatient also shields one from being forgotten. There’s nothing worse than being forgotten. Just think of the value of the Steve Jobs’ estate if people just suddenly forgot about him and did their damndest to abolish all memory of him and everything he contributed to Apple. So, did people forget about Steve Jobs?
In fact, they made a movie about him two years after his death. Steve Jobs was a good example of an entrepreneur that valued being impatient. Most described him as not necessarily a “people person”, which is an overlooked quality in being impatient.
For myself personally, the value of being impatient is defined by my ungodly restraint from wanting to be beat the brakes off of investors/venture capitalists.